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WILLIAM S. VICKREY
Columbia University
THE theoretical economist's ideal model of the economic system is one
in which each participating unit lives in its own compartment, com-
pletely isolated from all others except through the process of economic
exchange. The market is such that prices are precisely determined by
competitive forces as modified by taxes and other well-defined and
specifically legislated provisions. Within these bounds each economic
unit acts only in terms of its own direct interest, trusting in an unseen
hand to bring harmony out of conflicting interests. But such a pure
competitive economic system, even if it could be realized, would be
far too rigid and heartless to serve as the economic basis for a tolerable
society. To be viable at all, such a system must provide at least some
softening of the corners and relaxation of the rigid rule of self-interest.
Some of this relaxation comes, in the earlier stages of economic de-
velopment, from the sheer lack of universality in the economic system
itself. Not every economic good acquires at the outset the characteris-
tics of inviolable private property; gleaners, squatters, and scavengers
eke out an existence in the interstices of the formal system. But as
property rights become all-encompassing and the system becomes more
complex, the interstices change in character: they are no longer the
refuge of the dispossessed but rather the arena for the nimble, the
venturesome, and often the unscrupulous. Whether from a growing
social conscience, an advancing ethical standard, or response to the
sheer importunities of the indigent, some forms of succor for the un-
fortunate or the underprivileged emerge as a significant element in
nearly all the more highly structured civilizations. These range from
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casual almsgiving through tax-supported public welfare systems to
international aid such as that under the Marshall Plan.
Vol.untarism Versus Compulsion
Given that there are important functions to be performed outside the
economist's marketplace, it becomes appropriate to attempt to appraise
the various institutions performing them. One scale on which they
can be ranged is the degree to which the individual contribution is
voluntary rather than compulsory. At the one extreme lies the alms
given in secret, for which there is no motive beyond the desire to
respond to the promptings of conscience, and at the other is the heavy
hand of the tax collector, obtaining funds for purposes which in many
cases overlap considerably with those for which strictly voluntary gifts
are used. Ranging in between are contributions made under varying
degrees of social or other pressure, such as the importunities of the
panhandler, the sanctions of the clerical hierarchy, the threat of social
ostracism, the withdrawal of such benefits as good will, or the super-
stitious fear of losing the favors of Dame Fortune. The history of the
development of the welfare state can be told, in part, in terms of the
growing need for works of public beneficence beyond the ability or
at least the willingness of the public to respond voluntarily, and the
substitution of tax-financed welfare disbursements for voluntary char-
ity as a consequence. An ultrarationalist might claim that the result
of this trend would be to so develop public welfare programs that
there would be little or no need for private charity. While there has
been a pronounced shift, in recent decades, in the relative roles of
tax-supported and voluntary public welfare outlays, there are limits
beyond which this trend does not seem likely to go. Under almost any
conceivable development of the public sector, there will remain areas
where voluntary support will be more appropriate; and in many areas,
where either method of financing might be possible, voluntary financ-
ing has advantages that are not to be lost sight of.
Church and State
One of the largest areas in which voluntary giving is likely to remain
the main resource is the support of religious institutions. To be sure,
in a theocratic state, support of the church and support of the state
are often so intermingled that the distinction between tax and tithe
almost disappears. In countries with an established church, establish-
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ment usually carries with it some degree of financial support from
funds collected in a compulsory manner, whether termed taxes or
tithes; however, this can vary all the way from virtually complete sup-
port to a mere grant of minor special privileges.
Even where the principle of separation of church and state is the
rule, various privileges accorded churches and similar institutions
amount to a fairly substantial subsidy. In the United States, their
property, amounting to some $15 billion,islargely exempt from
property tax; at effective rates averaging probably between 1.5 and
2.5 per cent, this is an effective subsidy on the order of $300 million.
Even greater is the subsidy in effect granted through the deduction
allowed for contributions in computing the individual income tax:
of $5.6 billion claimed for such contributions in 1958 returns itemiz-
ing deductions, probably $3 billion or more went to religious organiza-
tions.' This is deducted in returns with marginal rates averaging about
30 per cent, indicating a subsidy on the order of $900 million (in the
sense that, had this $3 billion not been given to churches, $900 million
of additional income tax would have been collected). In the face of
subsidies thus aggregating over $1 billion a year to specifically religious
activities, the furor over public aid to religiously controlled or spon-
sored education, to say nothing of the use of public school buses by
parochial school students, brings up questions of the relative digesti-
bility of gnats and camels.
Nevertheless, separation of church and state requires, at the very
minimum, that religious institutions have sufficient voluntary support
to eliminate the danger that subsidization, through tax exemption or
otherwise, will provide an occasion for undue interference of the state
in the affairs of the religious body, or vice versa. State subsidies in the
form of deductions allowed for contributions have the virtue that they
are distributed with reference to the independent voluntary support
that the various institutions attract, so that the question of budgetary
allocation does not arise. Conversely, since the allocation is automatic,
there islittle likelihood that lobbying for an increased share will
arise, though we have seen that where the degree of interest in specific
activities, such as church controlled schools, varies among faiths, a
religious issue can become intermingled with political issues.
While preserving a nation from the taint of establishment on the
1TheAmerican Association of Fund-Raising Counsel estimates that religion ac-
counts for 51 per cent of all philanthropic giving, and presumably a larger propor-
tion of individual than of corporate and foundation giving, but possibly a smaller
proportion of upper income bracket giving covered by the standard deduction.
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one hand and godless secularism on the other does require some volun-
tary support of religion, this support need not be completely private,
as tax deductibility shows, nor need it be in all cases strictly gratuitous.
Though most forms of "selling" religious services have their obnoxious
features, it must be recorded that in the past considerable revenues
have been obtained for religious organizations by practices that range
from simony in its explicit form, through sale of indulgences, fees for
marriages and other rites, to pew rentals, and the like. While many
of these practices represent relatively innocuous ways of obtaining
church funds, the lingering taint of simony on the one hand and
commercialism on the other has led to their deemphasis. Even where
fees are retained in conjunction with religious rites, either the amount
is left largely to voluntary determination, or an amount is specified for
the aesthetic elaboration of a ceremonial which, in more spartan form,
is available without charge. While the practice is often inferior to the
theory, the ideals usually expressed concerning the financing of reli-
gious institutions call for voluntary contributions commensurate with
the means of the faithful, and sanctioned primarily by the urgings of
the individual conscience, rather than by any threat of ostracism or of
the withholding of ritual benefits.
The practical working out of the separation of church and state
however, has led to many economically wasteful practices. In many
instances, public educational facilities are unavailable for activities
that have a religious or sectarian aspect. This is one factor in the
complex of forces that has resulted in a quasi-duplication of educa-
tional facilities, one set being used five days a week for secular educa-
tion and the other, generally inferior set, being used often only one-
half day per week for religious education. The situation is at its ex-
treme when, under "released time" arrangements, students are dis-
missed from public school ahead of the normal time in order that they
be enabled to attend religious classes of a type approved by their
parents, but in and in some cases distant, facilities. There
would seem to be a significant inconsistency in subsidizing the con-
struction of religious facilities through tax exemption on the one
hand, while on the other denying the use of alternative facilities that
would otherwise be idle, on the grounds that this would involve the
establishment of a religion by the state. To be sure, many religious
groups would doubtless still wish to provide separate facilities that
could be more closely integrated with the other activities of the con-
gregation, but in terms of the economics involved, if they choose to
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do this it should only be after considering the full costs of the alterna-
tives.
As is usually the case with special tax exemptions, those to religious
bodies involve special problems and unintended effects. Restrictions
on tax exemption of church property vary from one local jurisdiction
to another. In rare cases exemption is applied to all property owned by
a religious organization, regardless of character or use. Where the
religious organization is in a position to derive explicit revenue from
the property, an exemption so inclusive is obviously open to serious
abuse: its benefits are capable of being multiplied beyond all reason
through the expansion of activities only remotely related to any
religious purpose. Not only is the loss of revenue a problem, but in
many cases there is more or less direct competition with enterprise not
favored with comparable tax privileges, and there are obvious grounds
for complaint.
In order to prevent such abuses, exemption is more often limited
to that part of the property devoted specifically to a religious use and
not operated for revenue. But this also, when applied too rigorously,
leads to economic waste. A common example is that of a church, lo-
cated near a suburban shopping center and railroad station, which is
encouraged, if not actually required by zoning ordinances, to provide
a parking lot on its property for its congregation. This lot is then kept
vacant during most of the week, though neighboring streets are parked
as solid as the regulations will allow, lest the revenues that might be
obtained from operating the parking space during the week be con-
sidered to forfeit the tax-exempt status of the property.
Even where appropriate adjustments are possible, so that the more
obvious inefficiencies do not arise, there is a considerable bias intro-
duced into the choice of means by which philanthropic purposes are
served: land and buildings are favored with tax exemptions which
do not apply to salaries.2 To be sure, this may be regarded as merely
the removal of a bias which otherwise afflicts economic activity in gen-
eral, but even so, the consequences are probably inferior to what
would result if a less prejudicial form of support for the activity were
available.
2 Where education is concerned, this is another factor contributing indirectly to
the tendency to provide bricks rather than brains.
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Public and Private Contributions
Even outside the peculiarly sensitive area of religion, there are large
areas where for one reason or another the more cumbersome apparatus
of the state seems a less appropriate means of effecting the desired
results than private contribution. In some cases this is because the
activity in question appeals to a restricted class of individuals: the
maintenance of a dog cemetery, or the maintenance of bird sanctuaries,
or support for the climbing of Mt. Everest. Examples of this sort are,
however, increasingly hard to find: Gàddard's experiments with rockets
could not find support through public appropriations, but we now
find a million-fold expansion of his line of effort carried out with
public funds. Private philanthropy very often provides limited means
for initiating an activity which may later receive large public support
once its value has been demonstrated.
In some cases the advantage of privately financed philanthropy
arises from a greater freedom of action: the ability to discriminate in
dispensing benefits, for example, may be necessary either to arrive at
clear-cut results or to prevent the available resources from being spread
uselessly thin; public auspices are more likely to find themselves handi-
capped either by beneficiaries who congest facilities, demanding a
share as of right, or by sheer bureaucratic demands for some sort of
uniformity. The Arrowsmith dilemma is often a vexing one, but when
it occurs in a public operation the choice of long-run scientific advance
rather than short-run palliative is much more likely to seem, to many,
an abuse of power.
Another reason for entrusting an activity to privately financed agen-
cies is the cumbersomeness of public agencies in dealing with rela-
tively small-scale activities. To be sure, a considerable degree of im-
provement is possible in the administration of support for small proj-
ects through the establishment of subsidiary agencies, subcontracting,
and the like, but there is always the basic conflict between, on the, one
hand, the expenditure of the time and effort of high-level decision-
making bodies on matters of small magnitude in which they have
relatively little basis for judgment, and on the other, the dilution of
underlying accountability and responsibility to the point where there
are excessive opportunities for waste or extravagance (or merely the
undue promotion of the hobbies of individual administrators).
Closely related to this is the idea that activities financed through
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carried out than when financed from public funds. Certainly admin-
istrators and employees of voluntary agencies who are aware that they
are spending the widow's mite, or that the probability is slight that
"there is more where that came from" are likely to be somewhat more
concerned to use what they have carefully than where the vast re-
sources of the state are available. An additional argument often cited
is the fact that voluntary agencies are often able to secure conscien-
tious work at wages that are considerably below the rates which com-
parable work would command in public employment, and below the
going rates generally; in addition a considerable amount of free volun-
teer service is often obtainable. But too much should not be made of
this: the response to the proposal for a Peace Corps indicates that
under proper circumstances large amounts of volunteer effort can be
mobilized under public as well as under private auspices; the ability
to secure competent services at lower wage rates should properly be
regarded not as an economy in the use of resources, but partly as the
eliciting of an additional contribution in kind from these employees.
It is possible that if these employees were to do the same work under
public auspices at higher pay they would devote part of the difference
to the support of other philanthropy. It is also possible that they
derive more immediate satisfaction from doing the work under
private auspices than they would under public; indeed, in a com-
pletely rational market this would be the necessary inference to be
drawn from the fact of the wage differential.
To some extent, also, this efficiency differential may be considered
a scale effect: where an activity is conducted on a large scale, and
especially where it acquires a quasi-official status, as with the Red
Cross, the identification of the administrator or employee with the
contributor tends to diminish, and the pressure for efficiency tends to
relax. Moreover, in large scale philanthropic enterprise there is often
no clear-cut criterion of efficiency comparable to that provided in a
large industrial organization whose accounting procedures provide
allocated profits and losses as figures of merit. To this extent, then,
the argument for voluntary activity on the basis of efficiency may be
applicable primarily to activities that can be carried out on a small
scale rather than those which by their nature require large scale effort.
Costs of Financing
Over-all efficiency is not merely a matter of expenditure of funds, but
also of their collection. Here the picture is confused and the variety of
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situations is great. The marginal cost of public funds can be thought
of as comprising three components: the marginal administrative cost
of collecting increased sums in taxes, the marginal taxpayer compli-
ance cost occasioned by an increase in the tax burden, and the mar-
ginal misallocation cost. Misallocation cost is the loss of economic effi-
ciency which results from the distortions introduced into the opera-
tion of the economy by increasing tax rates and which induces more
and more drastic adaptations, taken either directly or at several re-
moves, to the changes in relative opportunities which the tax increase
brings about. These adaptations may or may not have as a conscious
intent the minimization of the tax burden. Rough ideas of average
administration and compliance cost are comparatively easy to come
by; the corresponding marginal costs may be somewhat more elusive,
but in most cases will be relatively modest. Of course, one must be
wary of estimating marginal administrative and compliance costs on
the basis of the assumption that an increase in public expenditure is
automatically to be covered by a simple increase in, say, the individual
income tax rates. It cannot be concluded thereby that, since the only
difference is in the size of the figures on the returns, these marginal
costs will he negligible. Rate increases tend to provoke elaboration of
the law, the litigation of issues that otherwise would not be raised,
and increased evasion which in turn calls for increased countermeas-
ures; moreover increased pressure for revenue may induce the intro-
duction of new taxes. But by and large these costs will be minor.
The misallocation cost is the great uncertainty, and in the absence of
well-grounded estimates, opinions as to the magnitude of this Cost will
vary widely according to political complexion. A low over-all estimate
for the cost of federal funds might run as low as 10 per cent, whereas
for a hard pressed municipality with a poorly administered tax system
the marginal cost of public funds might well run as high as 50 per
cent.
The cost of voluntary contributions has a somewhat different com-
position. There is little here to correspond to the misallocation cost
involved in taxation; it is difficult to think of potential contributors
taking any drastic action to avoid the obligation to contribute, al-
though some avoidance action may take place. Travellers may con-
sciously or unconsciously avoid areas where beggars abound; in our
own culture the prevalence of unlisted telephones may be, in small
part, a corresponding phenomenon. But in the aggregate this is likely
to be a negligible matter. Similarly, the time the individual takes in
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is probably far smaller in absolute amount than the effort expended
in preparing tax returns, though in proportion to the total volume of
contributions it may be more nearly comparable. The marginal effect
may also be relatively larger: a larger aggregate of contributions prob-
ably means a larger number of appeals and of responses, to a much
greater extent than a larger tax burden means a more numerous array
of taxes.
The cost of solicitation is another matter. In cases bordering on
fraud, costs have been known to cover a major fraction of the receipts.
At best, even a minimal solicitation, acknowledgment, and mainte-
nance of lists of contributors is likely to be a substantial fraction of the
cost of operation. This is particularly true of any organization that
depends on the repeated contributions of large numbers of small con-
tributors rather than the special favor of a few large contributors or
foundations.
The nominal costs of solicitation may not, however, be a true repre-.
sentation of social costs. A considerable amount is often spent for re-
ports and other literature produced either as an essential part or as
an adjunct to the principal activity of the agency. At one extreme the
value of this information to the contributor as a matter of interest or
usefulness may justify the cost of its distribution, wholly aside from
any incidental effect that its distribution may have in encouraging
contributions. At the other extreme the literature may be of little
value except as a means of inducing the contributor to maintain his
contributions. Since not much is available in the way of uniform re-
ports on the outlays of philanthropic agencies, particularly of the
smaller units, the question of where particular agencies draw the line
between outlays for fund raising and outlays for other activities is
largely academic.
Many agencies in raising funds find it psychologically effective to
affix postage stamps to the return envelopes, which constitutes a some-
what different type of expense than that involved in other costs asso-
ciated with fund raising. Since this involves a lower postage rate than
when business reply envelopes are used, there may even be some saving
in those cases where the response rate is high. To the extent that the
rate differential reflects the extra cost to the post office of handling
business reply mail, this saving is a genuine one in terms of resources.
On the other hand if a fairly large percentage of the postage stamps
remain unused, this is in effect a diversion of some of the contributed
funds to the post office, as a kind of offset to the benefits of tax exemp-
tion. To the extent that some of the addressees are induced to spend
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time and effort salvaging the stamps, this is then of course part of the
net social cost of the fund-raising operation. If this practice is psycho-
logically effective, however, it probably impairs rather than improves
the degree to which philanthropic contributions reflect the genuine
underlying interests of the contributors.
There are other methods of raising philanthropic funds which have
their own peculiarities, ranging from the church bazaar through bingo
to the beaux-arts ball. The varied motivations for and benefits derived
from these activities in addition to the fund-raising goal resist easy
generalization. At one extreme the philanthropic aspect does little
more than cast a mantle of respectability over indulgences that would
otherwise be condemned; too often the price exacted for this cachet
is absurdly low. In other instances the benefit becomes an activity
worthwhile in its own right and needing only the catalyst of charitable
purpose to bring it off. But there are many cases where a cold hard
look at the relation between the results and the effort and sacrifice that
went into them would produce a finding that the game was not worth
the candle. To be sure, all ventures, whether for profit or for charity,
entail some risk; the peculiar mixture of free and costly goods and
services in philanthropy makes the evaluation of the results peculiarly
difficult.
Interaction in Giving
There remains, however, perhaps the largest and the most difficult ele-
ment in the social cost of voluntary and of public finance: the mean-
ing to the contributor of giving up the amount contributed, volun-
tarily at one extreme and compulsorily at the other. A strict positivist
might claim that in the case of a voluntary contribution the donor, on
balance, gains in satisfaction at least as much as he would by spending
the money in other ways (otherwise he would not have made the con-
tribution). This might be valid in the case of an atomistically moti-
vated contribution; in practice however we are in a situation akin to
that of monopolistic competition where one's own behavior is ex-
pected to influence that of others, and so in making a choice one must
allow not only for direct, but also for these indirect effects. The phrase
sometimes used in connection with more substantial donations "in
consideration of the gifts of others" is not a mere legal form but has
economic substance. Financing a given public welfare service by taxa-
tion in a community of peers could then be considered merely a for-
malization of this implied agreement. Even if we set up a rigorous
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model of the situation, including the living standards of all members
of the community as arguments in the utility function of each donor,
it is no longer necessary to say that a donation by A, designed to in-
crease the standard of living of X, Y, and Z, must yield A as much
utility through this effect as it would if spent to raise A's own standard
of living. A will expect that B and C may also be induced by his gift
to contribute to the same or similar objectives. The combined effects
of A's original gift plus that of the induced gifts on the standard of
living of X, Y, and Z will provide for A a level of satisfaction equal to
what he would have o.btained had he kept the amount of his contribu-
ti.on for himself. Indeed, in some instances this interdependence of
giving is formalized by the device of conditional or matching gifts,
whereby a donor pledges to contribute a given amount provided that
some specified amount is raised from other sources, or agrees to con-
tribute in porportion to the gifts obtained from others. The donor
might derive satisfaction from the direct consequences of his gift,
sufficient to compensate him for making it, even without considering
the effects of the gifts induced from others, but some fairly significant
degree of interdependence does exist. From the point of view of we!-
fare economics, this can be considered as a case of compounded exter-
nal economies: not only do the expenditures of X, Y, and Z have
favorable neighborhood effects on A, but the facilitating of these ex-
penditures by A has favorable repercussions on B and C, and vice
versa.
On the other side, it is not always clear that the payment of a tax
or compulsory contribution is to be considered a clear net burden on
the taxpayer, even before the benefits purchased with the tax are taken
into consideration. If all similarly situated individuals are required to
pay comparable tax increments, each taxpayer may feel relatively just
as well off. In absolute terms, he may feel considerably better off than
he would have felt if he had been singled out for a discriminatory levy.
There is even some experimental evidence for this contention in the re-
sults of certain game experiments conducted at RAND and elsewhere.
These indicate that at least in some situations in which the possibility
of a competitive relationship is present there is a natural tendency on
the part of individuals to maximize their relative rather than their
absolute position. In the situations studied, two individuals not known
to each other and having no direct means of communication with each
other were asked to select on a given signal one of two actions, there
being four possible combinations thus resulting. Previous to each
series of trials each of the two individuals was shown a payoff matrix
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specifying the amounts that each player was to receive in the event
of each of the four outcomes, the sum of the winnings of the two play-
ers being variable rather than constant. Results differed with variously
structured payoff matrices, but the principle upon which a wider
variety of the results could be rationalized than any other was that
the players acted with the intention of maximizing the difference be-
tween their own winnings and those of their opponents.
There is, to be sure, a certain element of contradiction between a
hypothesis that the motive of A is to outdo B and that hence B's
success is a negative element in A's satisfaction, on the one hand, and
that A can derive satisfaction from improvements in the situation of
X, Y, and Z resulting from his gifts and those induced thereby from
others. But this contradiction can probably be adequately resolved by
assuming that where the individuals involved are of roughly compar-
able status, as A and B, the competitive or negative element may tend
to predominate, particularly in a situation structured to resemble a
game where success tends to be regarded as predominantly a relative
matter, whereas between individuals such as A and X, comparability
is so remote as to make any competitive element almost irrelevant,
and the element of empathy becomes controlling.
This situation can be roughly pictured in the following diagram.
We can think of. individuals ranked along a line according to income
or economic status, Y, relative to a particular individual A; the degree
to which A obtains satisfaction from the welfare of others may be
described in a curve EA(Y), which typically has a peak near A and
tapers off in either direction, the exact shape depending on the tem-
perament of the individual A; a secondary and fairly sharp peak may
exist for some charismatic leadership group near the top of the status
scale. Similarly, we can describe the influence of the typical rivalry
between A and others in a curve RA(Y), somewhat similar to EA(Y),
but much more sharply peaked, dropping off rapidly to a level of
practically zero within a relatively short distance on either side. Ri-
valry being a negative interaction and empathy a positive one, by
subtracting R from E we get the net interaction or neighborhood
effect, NA(Y), which may be negative in the neighborhood of A, but
can be thought of as having a positive peak at an income some dis-
tance below YA, and possibly one or two other peaks at an income
above Further,we can draw a marginal utility of income curve
as perceived by A, representing the amount of satisfaction that
A thinks individuals at different income levels will receive from an
increment of income (or of expenditure on their behalf) and multiply
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High Status
E4(Y)
NA(Y) byUA(Y), and also by a factor representing the "contagion ef-
fect" of A's contributions on the contributions of others (it would be
very difficult to say anything specific about the variation of this con-
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income levels); the result can be shown as a curve MA(Y), representing
the marginal utility to A of a contribution by him for the benefit of
persons of status Y. If a horizontal line is drawn at a level representing
the marginal utility of income to A, cutting MA(Y) at V and W, and
possibly also at K and L, then the individuals in the status range in-
dicated by V and J'Vcanbe considered the natural objects of A's
bounty. The possible KL range can be considered to cover the case
of the charwoman who knits a shawl for the princess, or more gen-
erally of the MP who as her representative votes for a substantial civil
list, though cases of this sort can be fitted only somewhat awkwardly
into such a scheme.
Of course, in addition to distances measured by income or economic
status, there will also be distances in terms of age, race, culture, geo-
graphic location, and other characteristics to which a similar discussion
might apply.
The net result of these considerations seems to be that it is not pos-
sible to say anything very definite from a strictly behavioral point of
view on the relative subjective sacrifice involved in the making of a
gift and the payment of a tax, though on balance the evidence may
seem to point to the tax as more painful than the gift, but not by any-
thing like the amount of loss suffered, say, if the same quantum of
resources had been destroyed by some uninsured catastrophe.
Philanthropy and Redistribution
Private and public philanthropy are both often regarded primarily
as instruments for the redistribution of resources so as to diminish
economic inequalities. But the differences between the degree to which
public and private philanthropy accomplish this are probably much
more striking, in terms of the evidence available, than casual observa-
tion would lead one to expect. The analysis of the preceding section
might indicate that the natural objects of philanthropy of a given
economic stratum are those located only a moderate distance down
the scale, rather than at the bottom. Such data as we have as to the
character of giving indicate that the difference in economic level be-
tween donor and beneficiary is comparatively small. According to the
1950 BLS—Wharton School sample survey, 32.6 per cent of all gifts
were in the nature of family and reciprocity gifts having a minimal
redistributional content; 21.4 per cent were gifts for the support of
individuals, including alimony, representing some redistribution, but
in most cases largely among relatives and spanning a relatively narrow
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spread of status. Another 29.4 per cent of all giving was to religious
institutions, and while these might be thought of as agencies through
which redistribution would take place, a very large fraction of this
amount is spent for the maintenance of activities in the congregation,
and only a minor fraction finds its way to the support of outside activi-
ties. Moreover, as public welfare agencies have taken over a large
portion of the burden of caring for the indigent, the channeling of
alms through religious agencies has correspondingly diminished in im-
portance. Further, the ratio of gifts to religious organizations to dis-
cretionary receipts was remarkably constant over all the income levels
covered by this survey. To consider that redistribution amounts to any
very substantial part of this category of contribution would require
the assumption that the individual's share in the consumption of
religious services constitutes, in technical economic terms, a very "in-
ferior" good, indeed!
The next largest single categàry among objects of individual philan-
thropy is education. Here again, casual observation suggests that the
beneficiaries tend to belong to social and economic strata not very far
removed from those of the donors: private schools and colleges are
supported in considerable measure by their own graduates; students
at such institutions are often drawn from social' strata not far removed
from those of the chief benefactors, and even scholarship holders come
in large measure from middle class rather than the poorest strata in
the population. Indeed, some of the giving of this kind could well
be regarded as the repayment of aloan or at least of the reciprocation
of a previous gift, and thus have no redistributive consequences at all.
Not enough is known about the remainder of private philanthropy
to warrant much being said without further appraisal. But the over-
all picture would appear to remain one in which the role of philan-
thropy in redistribution is relatively slight.
This impression is somewhat reinforced by the examination of the
figures available from income tax returns on the distribution of chari-
table contributions by income classes. Data on contributions are un-
fortunately limited to those returns of taxpayers who elect to itemize
deductions; in 1958, the latest year for which data are available, such
returns were only 35 per cent of the total number, though they ac-
counted for slightly over half of the adjusted gross income. As shown
in Table 1,the proportion of returns that itemize deductions in-
creases steadily with income. It can be presumed therefore that, since
a relatively large amount of contributions would be one of the factors
inducing taxpayers to itemize, ceteris pan bus, the itemizing taxpayers
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Cost of Cot. 7
Income of Cot. 5 Contrib- Disposable Cot. 8
Itemizers (per cent) tions Income (per cent)
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
10,046 21.54 2,164 a a
174,300 8.28 13,626 116,505 11.70
578,099 7.10 37,343 386,684 9.66
1,077,804 6.15 58,034 757,164 7.66
1,905,776 5.46 89,656 1,392,209 6.44
2,653,578 5.07 114,048 1,970,476 5.79
3,659,665 4.82 146,627 2,731,357 5.37
4,900,598 4.45 179,374 3,681,170 4.87
6,172,608 4.27 214,427 4,634,058 4.63
7,481,243 4.00 249,627 5,639,531 4.43
17,837,342 3.67 539,887 13,343,556 4.05
16,861,809 3.57 485,414 12,580,871 3.86
13,430,839 3.41 366,550 9,959,190 3.68
1,354,116 3.36 271,653 7,645,980 3.55
7,525,975 3.36 197,250 5,527,028 3.57
17,710,772 3.45 473,574 13,005,654 3.64
7,297,241 3.42 172,665 5,323,023 3.24
4,758,024 3.39 104,426 3,418,940 3.05
10,913,850 3.42 207,649 7,460,084 2.78
5,823,403 4.38 93,790 3,553,809 2.64
1,615,248 6.18 26,244 923,337 2.84
651,423 7.52 9,970 377,432 2.64
1,109,114 10.40 12,440 649,997 1.91
357,883 13.25 4,172 231,307 1.80
498,205 19.45 8,481 353,896 2.40
145,358,961 3.92 4,079,091 105,663,258 3.86
aNegativedisposable income.
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will, on the average within each income class, make relatively greater
contributions than nonitemizing taxpayers. Nevertheless, over ranges
where the proportion of itemizing taxpayers does not change too
abruptly, the figures presented in Table 1 represent reasonably well
the degree to which contributions are concentrated in the upper in-
come classes.
Column 6 shows the crude ratio of gross contributions reported to
the adjusted gross income of itemizers. It is seen that in the lower in-
come classes singling Out the itemizers is highly selective of those
taxpayers with relatively large contributions. This selectivenessis
somewhat less severe as incomes increase; the proportion of contribu-
tions drops to a low of 3.36 per cent in the $8,000—$9,000 class, there-
after rising gradually to a maximum of nearly 20 per cent for incomes
over one million dollars. This is a reasonably progressive showing, par-
ticularly as the maximum limit for the individual on the deduction of
contributions is in most cases 30 per cent of adjusted gross income.
To assess properly the effect of contributions on the distribution of
income, however, it is necessary to consider the fact that only part of
the gross contribution reported represents a net sacrifice to the tax-
payer; depending on the marginal tax rate, a fairly substantial part
of the cost of the contributions represents a reduction in the tax
that would otherwise have become due. On the basis of a composite
weighted mean marginal rate, derived from the marginal rates for the
various categories of taxpayers in each income class, the net cost of
the contributions is given in column 7. It is appropriate to consider
this net cost in relation to the net disposable income the taxpayer
would have had, had he made no contributions (see col. 8 of Table .1).
This is obtained by taking total income, correcting it to reflect in full
the capital gains and losses reported for the current year, subtracting
all allowable deductions, and also the income tax itself, and adding
the cost of the contributions as given in column 7. The resulting
ratios are given in column 9, where it is apparent that instead of the
proportion of contributions increasing with income, there is a substan-
tial and steady decrease in the percentage of disposable income sacri-
ficed, except for a modest increase in the top income class.
These figures are also, of course, subject to considerable bias through
the selective effect of considering only itemizing returns, but this fac-
tor is hardly sufficient to change the general picture for income classes
above $5,000. There are other biases that would tend to strengthen
the trend shown: in the absence of data, no adjustment was made to
include tax exempt interest and similar items in the disposable in-
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come. Nor are capital gains unreported for income tax purposes repre-
sented in the figures, whether because the assets are held to the death
of the taxpayer or, more relevantly for present purposes, because they
are used as the medium in which the gift is made. In this latter in-
creasingly frequent case, not only is the gain not reported, but the
full market value of the asset is used as the basis for the charitable
deduction, so that the cost of the contribution is even less, on this ac-
count, than that shown in the table. While this practice is one well-
known to fund raisers, there are no data available on its magnitude.
Its prevalence, however, should quiet any qualms that one might
have about the inclusion of realized capital gains in a disposable
income figure to which the cost of the contribution is to be related.
To what extent does the tax deductibility of gifts stimulate giving?
Unfortunately the data available provide very little evidence on this
question. At the lower level, we do have separate data for taxable
and nontaxable returns at the various income levels, but the effect
of selecting only itemized returns is to make the ratio of gifts to dis-
posable income uniformly higher for the nontaxable returns (Table 2).
Also, since the classification of returns is by adjusted gross income,
returns in a given income class are more likely to be nontaxable if
they have large contributions. The combined effect of these two influ-
ences is to mask completely any possible tendency for the tax deduc-
TABLE 2








































































































5.0 and over21,522,83612,114,79956.29 206,227 132,02264.173.66 7.043.4712.17
Total 45,652.13419,053,71441.7413,433,0481,757,70813.083.85 5.803.71 8.73
a Negative adjusted gross income.
b Negative disposable income
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TABLE 3














































































































Itemizing returns by net income; nonitemizing, by income.
bLessthan 500.
tionin taxable returns to induce a higher level of giving. Data for
earlier years is available by net income classes, and without the com-
plication of the nonitemizin.g return; the data for 1940 and 1941 are
compared in Table 3, showing the effect of the introduction of the
standard deduction for returns under $3,000; Table 4 compares 1943
and 1944, showing the effect of extending the standard deduction
privilege to incomes above $3,000. However, the data are open to the
interpretation that the taxability of the return merely makes the tax-
payer more careful to list all of his contributions, whereas the filer
of the nontaxable return may simply not bother to list all of his deduc-
tions, even though his contributions may be just as large.
50TABLE 4
EFFECTS OF TAXABILITY AND NONITEMIZING ON REPORTED CONTRIBUTIONS, 1943—44
. Ratio of Gross
Contributions to
Per Cent of Net Income in













Negative Nontaxable 17 192
0 to 0.5 Taxable 218
Nontaxable644
Total 862
0.5 to 0.75Taxable 754 131
Nontaxable208 159
Total 962 290
0.75 to 1.00Taxable 1106 304
Nontaxable 121 103
Total 1227 407
1.00 to 1.25Taxable 1332 412
Nontaxable128 66
Total 1460 478









































1.50 to 1.75 1517 512 2371 2947 39.0 14.8 3.64 6.15
1.75 to 2.00 1646 523 2135 2880 43.5 15.4 3.38 5.70
2.00 to 2.25 1628 513 1842 2617 46.9 16.4 3.20 5.50
2.25 to 2.50 1579 511 1556 2359 50.4 17.8 1.86 5.33
2.50 to 2.75 1446 519 1289 2268 52.9 18.6 3.09 5.02
2.75 to 3.00 1680 495 1069 2019 61.1 19.7 2.74 4.89
3.0 to 3.5 2991 873 — 3260 100.0 21.1 2.42 4.83
3.5 to 4.0 1685 621 — 2165 100.0 22.3 2.37 4.72
4.0 to 4.5 902 422 — 1356 100.0 23.7 2.32 4.77
4.5 to 5.0 509 273 — 766 100.0 26.3 2.27 4.46
5 to 6 469 305 — 628 100.0 32.7 2.27 4.49
6 to 7 250 174 — 244100.0 41.6 2.31 4.38
7 to 8 166 97 — 123 100.0 44.1 2.26 4.04
8 to 9 120 73 — 78 100.0 48.3 2.28 3.93
9 to 10 95 58 — 54 100.0 51.8 2.25 3.85
10 to 15 231 180 — 118 100.0 60.4 2.11352
15 to 20 101 93 — 14 100.0 71.5 2.12 3.21
20 to 25 54 53 — 14 100.0 79.1 2.15 3.07Philanthropy and Public Policy
TABLE5
PROGRESSIVITYOF NET CHARITABLE BEQUESTS, 1959
(money figures in thousands of dollars)
TAXABLE ANDNONTAXABLE ESTATES NONTAXABLE ESTATES
Net Cost of Net Cost of
Charitable Bequests Charitable Bequests
Per Cent of Per Cent of
Disposable DisposableDisposable Disposable
GROSS ESTATE Estate Amount Estate Estate Amount Estate
CLASSES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oto6O 450 — — 450 — —
60 to 70 365,685 7,138 1.95 250,625 7,033 2.81
70 to 80 426,829 7,671 1.80 192,765 7,069 3.67
80 to 90 403,697 9,303 2.30 183,464 8,353 4.55
60 to 100 .86,049 6,534 1.69 180,359 5,560 3.08
100 to 120 694,739 12,846 1.85 315,741 10,399 3.29
120 to 150 825,212 17,218 2.09 153,383 12,914 8.42
150 to 200 928,677 22,930 2.47 44,413 16,805 37.84
200 to 300 1,101,702 30,580 2.78 29,005 17,784 61.31
300 to 500 1,062,246 41,110 3.87 22,598 19,233 85.11
500 to 1,000 1,111,714 57,663 5.19 19,051 16,212 83.13
1,000 to 2,000 714,490 44,834 6.27 8,737 7,544 86.35
2,000 to 3,000 280,095 35,316 12.61 5,191 3,748 72.20
3,000 to 5,000 224,218 28,731 12.65 2,421 2,382 98.39
5,000 to 10,000 205,581 22,705 11.04 4,607 1,707 37.05
10,000 to 20,000 131,592 12,466 9.47 — — —
20,000 andup 68,793 23,283 33.85 — — —
Totals' 9,068,299 516,447 5.695 1,435,603 159,536 11.11
a Calculatedfrom average ratios.
Other somewhat inconclusive evidence may be gleaned from estate
tax returns. Here the calculation of the ratio of net cost of contribu-
tion to net disposable estate shows a definite though somewhat irregu-
lar increase with size of gross estate (Tables 5 and 6). On the whole
one would expect that a wealthy taxpayer, anxious to take full advan-
tage of the tax deduction, would do his giving during his lifetime
so as to obtain the benefit of the income tax deduction in addition to
the avoidance of the estate tax. But of course a similar argument
could be made in favor of noncharitable inter vivos dispositions to
take advantage of the gift tax. In some cases earlier disposition during
52One Economist's View of Philanthropy
TABLE 6
EFFECTS OF CLASSIFrCATION BASIS ON CHARITABLE BEQUEST RATIOS, 1959
CLASSIFICATION BY NETESTATE CLASSIFICATION BY GROSS ESTATE
Charitable
Net Estate BequestsAverage Gross Gross Estate Charitable Bequests
Classes is Percent- Estate Classes as Percentage of Gross Estate
(thousandsofage of Gross(thousands of (thousands of AllTaxable Nontaxable
dollars) Estate dollars) dollars) EstatesEstatesEstates




























60 to 80 1.97 102.5 100to120
80 to 100 3.65 132.3 120to150
100 to 150 2.82 173.5 150to200

























































Total 5.10 259.5 Total 5.74 5.10 9.66Philanthropy and Public Policy
the lifetime of the donor may run up against the 30 per cent limit
on the deductibility of charitable contributions in the income tax,
whereas no corresponding limit exists for the estate tax. On the whole,
the evidence would seem to indicate that, viewed as demand for a
commodity whose price is reduced by the tax deductibility, demand
for "gross charity" has an elasticity smaller than one, and that, while
the deductibility iiiay increase the gross amount of contributions, it
does so by less than the tax relief granted. The net effect, therefore,
is to decrease the aggregate amount of net sacrifice incurred by the
donors, the increase in the proceeds to the beneficiaries being a burden
borne entirely by the fisc. One may well question whether it is sound
public policy to thus subsidize much more heavily the charities favored
by the wealthy as distinct from those appealing primarily to the
poorer contributors.
Although I have not looked into this matter recently, my impression
from earlier surveys is that the United States is almost unique in the
degree to which charitable contributions are subsidized through tax
exemption. In the United Kingdom, in order to qualify for exemption,
the gift must take the form of a transfer of income, in line with the
British predilection for considering only more or less repetitive trans-
fers as entitled to consideration under the income tax. In effect, a
donor must enter into a covenant with the beneficiary to pay a stated
sum regularly for a period of five years or more; when he makes these
payments he withholds the normal income tax, and the beneficiary as
an exempt entity is entitled to put in a claim for a refund of the tax
thus withheld on its income. lit is not clear to what extent, if any, this
has the psychological effect of inducing the donor to make a net pay-
ment of as much as the gross gift would have been without the tax,
so making the tax refund a net increment to the resources of the bene-
ficiary, or whether only the same gross gift tends to be made in any
case.
The most clear-cut cases of tax-induced philanthropy seem to derive
from the estate tax, where the establishment of a philanthropic foun-
dation under friendly control may be the means of avoiding the dis-
solution or loss of control of a family corporate empire. It has been
claimed that this was a significant factor in the creation of the Ford
Foundation. While these instances are striking when they occur, they
are probably relatively few in number.
If there were a substantial response of philanthropic contributions
to the inducement of income tax deductibility it would seem that it
would show up in a comparison of data for 1930—31, when the top
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TABLE 7








Gross Contributions as a
Percentage of Net Income
Net Cost of Contributions as a
Percentage of Disposable Income
1930—1932—
•
1930 1931 1932 1933 1930 1931 1932 1933
of dollars) 31 33
100 to 150 25 56 3.68 4.41 4.87 3.60 3.01 3.86 6.02 2.81
150 to 200 25 37 3.86 4.26 5.75 3.73 3.25 4.02 6.08 3.77
200 to 250 25 58 3.89 4.87 6.04 3.92 3.28 4.56 16.34 3.24
250 to 300 25 58 4.01 4.45 4.72 3.96 3.35 4.04 5.87 2.88
300 to 400 25 59 4.29 5.03 7.37 3.44 3.53 4.55 5.89 4.08
400 to 500 25 60 4.48 5.10 6.40 3.98 3.74 4.28 6.62 3.13
500 to 750 25 61 4.39 5.79 7.00 3.97 3.61 4.95 2.65
750 to 1000 25 62 4.90 6.28 5.37 5.62 3.98 6.60 4.45 2.90
Over 1000 2563 6.866.248.67 3.585.62 5.72 9.53 2.34
Over 500 2562± 6.016.147.293.99 4.92 5.6312.502.52
Over 100 2559±4.67 5.116.043.80.4.134.62 9.072.93
All returns 2.72 2.923.302.68
a Negativedisposable income due to large capital losses.
combined normal and surtax rates were 25 per cent on incomes over
$100,000, and 1932—33 when the rates at these income levels were more
than doubled, to from 56 per cent to 63 per cent. But examination of
this material, as presented in Table 7,indicatesno such responsiveness.
External Economies and Diseconomies in Fund Raising
The pursuit of the contributor's dollar has obvious external economies
and diseconomies not greatly dissimilar to those encountered in any
kind of selling activity. There is, on the one hand, the likelihood that
funds obtained through appeal may impinge on the funds available
for other contributions, and on the other, that appeals may reinforce
each other by enhancing the general level of giving. It is hard to
determine just what would be the socially optimal proportion of effort
to put into fund-raising activities. Aside from curbing the more ex-
treme practices that take undue advantage of psychological predilec-
tions or that verge on fraud, it is not clear just what modifying influ-
ences would, on balance, be in the public interest.
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Contributions and Macro-Economic Equilibrium
There is a sense in which the claim of the advertising industry that it
is a great creator of aggregate demand has a counterpart in the solicit-
ing of charitable contributions: to the extent that they are made out
of savings and that the proceeds are immediately disbursed, the con-
tributions tend to be a stimulus to the economy. Of course this stimu-
lus will be desirable or undesirable according to whether the economy
is or is not suffering from underemployment. If contributions were
relatively higher in periods of depression than in prosperity, as seems
to some slight extent to be the case, they would constitute a stabilizing
factor in the economy. It may be doubted, however, whether :this is
more true of charitable contributions than of many forms of personal
expenditure.
On the other hand, to the extent that charitable gifts or bequests
are made in the form of endowment funds, there may be a depressing
effect on the economy; the gift may have the effect. of reducing the
level of expenditure of the donor or of those who would have been
his beneficiaries in the absence of the charitable bequest. Probably
this effect is not large enough to be a primary concern.
Summary
The main suggestion that emerges from the above discussion is that
the methods and degree of public support to privately controlled
philanthropy needs to be thoroughly reexamined. Complete absence
of any subsidy of religion by the state is a gross fiction. Tax exemption,
particularly the deduction under the income tax, seems to be much
more an expression of the general predilection in this country for
privately organized and controlled philanthropy rather than a signifi-
cant stimulus to net giving. A concession that seemed moderate enough
when originally introduced has grown and changed shape with in-
creases in tax rates and the complexities of the law, so as to produce
results that are not only bizarre on occasion, but in their over-all
pattern seem to conform to no defensible social policy. The unac-
knowledged and haphazard array of subsidies that result from present
special tax privileges call for replacement with more uniform and ex-
plicit arrangements that can be brought into line with desirable public
policy.
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